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authorcanyonknight <canyonknight@gmail.com>2012-06-23 20:40:11 +0200
committerLukas Fleischer <archlinux@cryptocrack.de>2012-06-24 10:59:23 +0200
commit2c93f0a98f0f6380fd07ea17fd16afa2c6e4925b (patch)
treedc5fd78a8cb46cd1475b45eeaa6544fbdeb23280 /web/lib/aur.inc.php
parentbfb25807c49d3f35cdce91947a442455e1940392 (diff)
downloadaur-2c93f0a98f0f6380fd07ea17fd16afa2c6e4925b.tar.gz
aur-2c93f0a98f0f6380fd07ea17fd16afa2c6e4925b.tar.xz
Implement token system to fix CSRF vulnerabilities
Specially crafted pages can force authenticated users to unknowingly perform actions on the AUR website despite being on an attacker's website. This cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability applies to all POST data on the AUR. Implement a token system using a double submit cookie. Have a hidden form value on every page containing POST forms. Use the newly added check_token() to verify the token sent via POST matches the "AURSID" cookie value. Random nature of the token limits potential for CSRF. Signed-off-by: canyonknight <canyonknight@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Lukas Fleischer <archlinux@cryptocrack.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'web/lib/aur.inc.php')
-rw-r--r--web/lib/aur.inc.php10
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/web/lib/aur.inc.php b/web/lib/aur.inc.php
index 6bc36ac5..8b9f31ec 100644
--- a/web/lib/aur.inc.php
+++ b/web/lib/aur.inc.php
@@ -77,6 +77,16 @@ function check_sid($dbh=NULL) {
return;
}
+# Verify the supplied token matches the expected token for POST forms
+#
+function check_token() {
+ if (isset($_POST['token'])) {
+ return ($_POST['token'] == $_COOKIE['AURSID']);
+ } else {
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
# verify that an email address looks like it is legitimate
#
function valid_email($addy) {