diff options
author | Frédéric Buclin <LpSolit@gmail.com> | 2012-04-18 18:44:32 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Frédéric Buclin <LpSolit@gmail.com> | 2012-04-18 18:44:32 +0200 |
commit | 8dd0e8193d51f243b547cc0f4f21f5b3a1375ff2 (patch) | |
tree | e8dc402cbcbb88315400aab3d5bc1287b111539e | |
parent | b2d4b6c8ca356ae75f8e2e69dcb8f7c6e713b94b (diff) | |
download | bugzilla-8dd0e8193d51f243b547cc0f4f21f5b3a1375ff2.tar.gz bugzilla-8dd0e8193d51f243b547cc0f4f21f5b3a1375ff2.tar.xz |
Bug 728639: (CVE-2012-0465) [SECURITY] User lockout policy can be bypassed by altering the X-FORWARDED-FOR header
r=glob a=LpSolit
-rw-r--r-- | Bugzilla/Config/Advanced.pm | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Bugzilla/Config/Common.pm | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Bugzilla/Util.pm | 108 |
3 files changed, 117 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/Bugzilla/Config/Advanced.pm b/Bugzilla/Config/Advanced.pm index 7bf4a72f5..fa5b7d249 100644 --- a/Bugzilla/Config/Advanced.pm +++ b/Bugzilla/Config/Advanced.pm @@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ use constant get_param_list => ( { name => 'inbound_proxies', type => 't', - default => '' + default => '', + checker => \&check_ip }, { diff --git a/Bugzilla/Config/Common.pm b/Bugzilla/Config/Common.pm index 6433e55ce..0e3551d13 100644 --- a/Bugzilla/Config/Common.pm +++ b/Bugzilla/Config/Common.pm @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ use base qw(Exporter); qw(check_multi check_numeric check_regexp check_url check_group check_sslbase check_priority check_severity check_platform check_opsys check_shadowdb check_urlbase check_webdotbase - check_user_verify_class + check_user_verify_class check_ip check_mail_delivery_method check_notification check_utf8 check_bug_status check_smtp_auth check_theschwartz_available check_maxattachmentsize check_email check_smtp_ssl @@ -104,6 +104,15 @@ sub check_sslbase { return ""; } +sub check_ip { + my $inbound_proxies = shift; + my @proxies = split(/[\s,]+/, $inbound_proxies); + foreach my $proxy (@proxies) { + validate_ip($proxy) || return "$proxy is not a valid IPv4 or IPv6 address"; + } + return ""; +} + sub check_utf8 { my $utf8 = shift; # You cannot turn off the UTF-8 parameter if you've already converted diff --git a/Bugzilla/Util.pm b/Bugzilla/Util.pm index 91d40a4f2..097fc49fe 100644 --- a/Bugzilla/Util.pm +++ b/Bugzilla/Util.pm @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use base qw(Exporter); @Bugzilla::Util::EXPORT = qw(trick_taint detaint_natural detaint_signed html_quote url_quote xml_quote css_class_quote html_light_quote - i_am_cgi correct_urlbase remote_ip + i_am_cgi correct_urlbase remote_ip validate_ip do_ssl_redirect_if_required use_attachbase diff_arrays on_main_db say trim wrap_hard wrap_comment find_wrap_point @@ -262,12 +262,103 @@ sub correct_urlbase { sub remote_ip { my $ip = $ENV{'REMOTE_ADDR'} || '127.0.0.1'; my @proxies = split(/[\s,]+/, Bugzilla->params->{'inbound_proxies'}); - if (first { $_ eq $ip } @proxies) { - $ip = $ENV{'HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'} if $ENV{'HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'}; + + # If the IP address is one of our trusted proxies, then we look at + # the X-Forwarded-For header to determine the real remote IP address. + if ($ENV{'HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'} && first { $_ eq $ip } @proxies) { + my @ips = split(/[\s,]+/, $ENV{'HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'}); + # This header can contain several IP addresses. We want the + # IP address of the machine which connected to our proxies as + # all other IP addresses may be fake or internal ones. + # Note that this may block a whole external proxy, but we have + # no way to determine if this proxy is malicious or trustable. + foreach my $remote_ip (reverse @ips) { + if (!first { $_ eq $remote_ip } @proxies) { + # Keep the original IP address if the remote IP is invalid. + $ip = validate_ip($remote_ip) || $ip; + last; + } + } } return $ip; } +sub validate_ip { + my $ip = shift; + return is_ipv4($ip) || is_ipv6($ip); +} + +# Copied from Data::Validate::IP::is_ipv4(). +sub is_ipv4 { + my $ip = shift; + return unless defined $ip; + + my @octets = $ip =~ /^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/; + return unless scalar(@octets) == 4; + + foreach my $octet (@octets) { + return unless ($octet >= 0 && $octet <= 255 && $octet !~ /^0\d{1,2}$/); + } + + # The IP address is valid and can now be detainted. + return join('.', @octets); +} + +# Copied from Data::Validate::IP::is_ipv6(). +sub is_ipv6 { + my $ip = shift; + return unless defined $ip; + + # If there is a :: then there must be only one :: and the length + # can be variable. Without it, the length must be 8 groups. + my @chunks = split(':', $ip); + + # Need to check if the last chunk is an IPv4 address, if it is we + # pop it off and exempt it from the normal IPv6 checking and stick + # it back on at the end. If there is only one chunk and it's an IPv4 + # address, then it isn't an IPv6 address. + my $ipv4; + my $expected_chunks = 8; + if (@chunks > 1 && is_ipv4($chunks[$#chunks])) { + $ipv4 = pop(@chunks); + $expected_chunks--; + } + + my $empty = 0; + # Workaround to handle trailing :: being valid. + if ($ip =~ /[0-9a-f]{1,4}::$/) { + $empty++; + # Single trailing ':' is invalid. + } elsif ($ip =~ /:$/) { + return; + } + + foreach my $chunk (@chunks) { + return unless $chunk =~ /^[0-9a-f]{0,4}$/i; + $empty++ if $chunk eq ''; + } + # More than one :: block is bad, but if it starts with :: it will + # look like two, so we need an exception. + if ($empty == 2 && $ip =~ /^::/) { + # This is ok + } elsif ($empty > 1) { + return; + } + + push(@chunks, $ipv4) if $ipv4; + # Need 8 chunks, or we need an empty section that could be filled + # to represent the missing '0' sections. + return unless (@chunks == $expected_chunks || @chunks < $expected_chunks && $empty); + + my $ipv6 = join(':', @chunks); + # The IP address is valid and can now be detainted. + trick_taint($ipv6); + + # Need to handle the exception of trailing :: being valid. + return "${ipv6}::" if $ip =~ /::$/; + return $ipv6; +} + sub use_attachbase { my $attachbase = Bugzilla->params->{'attachment_base'}; return ($attachbase ne '' @@ -880,6 +971,17 @@ in a command-line script. Returns either the C<sslbase> or C<urlbase> parameter, depending on the current setting for the C<ssl_redirect> parameter. +=item C<remote_ip()> + +Returns the IP address of the remote client. If Bugzilla is behind +a trusted proxy, it will get the remote IP address by looking at the +X-Forwarded-For header. + +=item C<validate_ip($ip)> + +Returns the sanitized IP address if it is a valid IPv4 or IPv6 address, +else returns undef. + =item C<use_attachbase()> Returns true if an alternate host is used to display attachments; false |