From 0b14241a7c307a2619cb67cee42086b30fa03795 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Frédéric Buclin Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2012 17:01:20 +0100 Subject: (CVE-2012-0440) [SECURITY] JSON-RPC permits to bypass token checks and can lead to CSRF (no victim's action required) r=mkanat a=LpSolit https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=718319 --- Bugzilla/WebService/Server/JSONRPC.pm | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'Bugzilla/WebService/Server/JSONRPC.pm') diff --git a/Bugzilla/WebService/Server/JSONRPC.pm b/Bugzilla/WebService/Server/JSONRPC.pm index 3b232aafa..cec1c29ea 100644 --- a/Bugzilla/WebService/Server/JSONRPC.pm +++ b/Bugzilla/WebService/Server/JSONRPC.pm @@ -365,7 +365,19 @@ sub _argument_type_check { Bugzilla->input_params($params); - if ($self->request->method ne 'POST') { + if ($self->request->method eq 'POST') { + # CSRF is possible via XMLHttpRequest when the Content-Type header + # is not application/json (for example: text/plain or + # application/x-www-form-urlencoded). + # application/json is the single official MIME type, per RFC 4627. + my $content_type = $self->cgi->content_type; + # The charset can be appended to the content type, so we use a regexp. + if ($content_type !~ m{^application/json(-rpc)?(;.*)?$}i) { + ThrowUserError('json_rpc_illegal_content_type', + { content_type => $content_type }); + } + } + else { # When being called using GET, we don't allow calling # methods that can change data. This protects us against cross-site # request forgeries. -- cgit v1.2.3-24-g4f1b