summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/system/libraries/Input.php
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'system/libraries/Input.php')
-rw-r--r--system/libraries/Input.php38
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/system/libraries/Input.php b/system/libraries/Input.php
index 57696c8a2..8408b16fc 100644
--- a/system/libraries/Input.php
+++ b/system/libraries/Input.php
@@ -7,17 +7,17 @@
* @package CodeIgniter
* @author Rick Ellis
* @copyright Copyright (c) 2006, pMachine, Inc.
- * @license http://www.codeignitor.com/user_guide/license.html
+ * @license http://www.codeignitor.com/user_guide/license.html
* @link http://www.codeigniter.com
* @since Version 1.0
* @filesource
*/
-
+
// ------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Input Class
- *
+ *
* Pre-processes global input data for security
*
* @package CodeIgniter
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ class CI_Input {
if (is_array($_COOKIE) AND count($_COOKIE) > 0)
{
foreach($_COOKIE as $key => $val)
- {
+ {
$_COOKIE[$this->_clean_input_keys($key)] = $this->_clean_input_data($val);
}
}
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ class CI_Input {
/**
* Clean Input Data
*
- * This is a helper function. It escapes data and
+ * This is a helper function. It escapes data and
* standardizes newline characters to \n
*
* @access private
@@ -149,8 +149,8 @@ class CI_Input {
/**
* Clean Keys
*
- * This is a helper function. To prevent malicious users
- * from trying to exploit keys we make sure that keys are
+ * This is a helper function. To prevent malicious users
+ * from trying to exploit keys we make sure that keys are
* only named with alpha-numeric text and a few other items.
*
* @access private
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ class CI_Input {
function _clean_input_keys($str)
{
if ( ! preg_match("/^[a-z0-9:_\/-]+$/i", $str))
- {
+ {
exit('Disallowed Key Characters: '.$str);
}
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ class CI_Input {
* got from Bitflux: http://blog.bitflux.ch/wiki/XSS_Prevention
*
* To help develop this script I used this great list of
- * vulnerabilities along with a few other hacks I've
+ * vulnerabilities along with a few other hacks I've
* harvested from examining vulnerabilities in other programs:
* http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html
*
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ class CI_Input {
$str = preg_replace('#(&\#*\w+)[\x00-\x20]+;#u',"\\1;",$str);
/*
- * Validate UTF16 two byte encoding (x00)
+ * Validate UTF16 two byte encoding (x00)
*
* Just as above, adds a semicolon if missing.
*
@@ -429,20 +429,20 @@ class CI_Input {
$str = preg_replace("/%([a-z0-9]{2})/i", "&#x\\1;", $str);
/*
- * Convert character entities to ASCII
+ * Convert character entities to ASCII
*
* This permits our tests below to work reliably.
* We only convert entities that are within tags since
* these are the ones that will pose security problems.
*
*/
-
+
if (preg_match_all("/<(.+?)>/si", $str, $matches))
{
for ($i = 0; $i < count($matches['0']); $i++)
{
- $str = str_replace($matches['1'][$i],
- $this->_html_entity_decode($matches['1'][$i], $charset),
+ $str = str_replace($matches['1'][$i],
+ $this->_html_entity_decode($matches['1'][$i], $charset),
$str);
}
}
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ class CI_Input {
* Remove JavaScript Event Handlers
*
* Note: This code is a little blunt. It removes
- * the event handler and anything up to the closing >,
+ * the event handler and anything up to the closing >,
* but it's unlikely to be a problem.
*
*/
@@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ class CI_Input {
/*
* Sanitize naughty HTML elements
*
- * If a tag containing any of the words in the list
+ * If a tag containing any of the words in the list
* below is found, the tag gets converted to entities.
*
* So this: <blink>
@@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ class CI_Input {
foreach ($bad as $key => $val)
{
- $str = preg_replace("#".$key."#i", $val, $str);
+ $str = preg_replace("#".$key."#i", $val, $str);
}
@@ -582,11 +582,11 @@ class CI_Input {
/* -------------------------------------------------*/
/*
- NOTE: html_entity_decode() has a bug in some PHP versions when UTF-8 is the
+ NOTE: html_entity_decode() has a bug in some PHP versions when UTF-8 is the
character set, and the PHP developers said they were not back porting the
fix to versions other than PHP 5.x.
*/
- function _html_entity_decode($str, $charset='ISO-8859-1')
+ function _html_entity_decode($str, $charset='ISO-8859-1')
{
if (stristr($str, '&') === FALSE) return $str;