From ba9c11dce576becf8669a11519d69322066444c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Pritz Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2012 13:55:09 +0200 Subject: Use phpass for password hashing The current implementation sometimes failed to generate valid hashes (had something to do with the random salt). Signed-off-by: Florian Pritz --- application/third_party/PasswordHash.php | 253 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 253 insertions(+) create mode 100644 application/third_party/PasswordHash.php (limited to 'application/third_party') diff --git a/application/third_party/PasswordHash.php b/application/third_party/PasswordHash.php new file mode 100644 index 000000000..12958c7f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/application/third_party/PasswordHash.php @@ -0,0 +1,253 @@ + in 2004-2006 and placed in +# the public domain. Revised in subsequent years, still public domain. +# +# There's absolutely no warranty. +# +# The homepage URL for this framework is: +# +# http://www.openwall.com/phpass/ +# +# Please be sure to update the Version line if you edit this file in any way. +# It is suggested that you leave the main version number intact, but indicate +# your project name (after the slash) and add your own revision information. +# +# Please do not change the "private" password hashing method implemented in +# here, thereby making your hashes incompatible. However, if you must, please +# change the hash type identifier (the "$P$") to something different. +# +# Obviously, since this code is in the public domain, the above are not +# requirements (there can be none), but merely suggestions. +# +class PasswordHash { + var $itoa64; + var $iteration_count_log2; + var $portable_hashes; + var $random_state; + + function PasswordHash($iteration_count_log2, $portable_hashes) + { + $this->itoa64 = './0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'; + + if ($iteration_count_log2 < 4 || $iteration_count_log2 > 31) + $iteration_count_log2 = 8; + $this->iteration_count_log2 = $iteration_count_log2; + + $this->portable_hashes = $portable_hashes; + + $this->random_state = microtime(); + if (function_exists('getmypid')) + $this->random_state .= getmypid(); + } + + function get_random_bytes($count) + { + $output = ''; + if (is_readable('/dev/urandom') && + ($fh = @fopen('/dev/urandom', 'rb'))) { + $output = fread($fh, $count); + fclose($fh); + } + + if (strlen($output) < $count) { + $output = ''; + for ($i = 0; $i < $count; $i += 16) { + $this->random_state = + md5(microtime() . $this->random_state); + $output .= + pack('H*', md5($this->random_state)); + } + $output = substr($output, 0, $count); + } + + return $output; + } + + function encode64($input, $count) + { + $output = ''; + $i = 0; + do { + $value = ord($input[$i++]); + $output .= $this->itoa64[$value & 0x3f]; + if ($i < $count) + $value |= ord($input[$i]) << 8; + $output .= $this->itoa64[($value >> 6) & 0x3f]; + if ($i++ >= $count) + break; + if ($i < $count) + $value |= ord($input[$i]) << 16; + $output .= $this->itoa64[($value >> 12) & 0x3f]; + if ($i++ >= $count) + break; + $output .= $this->itoa64[($value >> 18) & 0x3f]; + } while ($i < $count); + + return $output; + } + + function gensalt_private($input) + { + $output = '$P$'; + $output .= $this->itoa64[min($this->iteration_count_log2 + + ((PHP_VERSION >= '5') ? 5 : 3), 30)]; + $output .= $this->encode64($input, 6); + + return $output; + } + + function crypt_private($password, $setting) + { + $output = '*0'; + if (substr($setting, 0, 2) == $output) + $output = '*1'; + + $id = substr($setting, 0, 3); + # We use "$P$", phpBB3 uses "$H$" for the same thing + if ($id != '$P$' && $id != '$H$') + return $output; + + $count_log2 = strpos($this->itoa64, $setting[3]); + if ($count_log2 < 7 || $count_log2 > 30) + return $output; + + $count = 1 << $count_log2; + + $salt = substr($setting, 4, 8); + if (strlen($salt) != 8) + return $output; + + # We're kind of forced to use MD5 here since it's the only + # cryptographic primitive available in all versions of PHP + # currently in use. To implement our own low-level crypto + # in PHP would result in much worse performance and + # consequently in lower iteration counts and hashes that are + # quicker to crack (by non-PHP code). + if (PHP_VERSION >= '5') { + $hash = md5($salt . $password, TRUE); + do { + $hash = md5($hash . $password, TRUE); + } while (--$count); + } else { + $hash = pack('H*', md5($salt . $password)); + do { + $hash = pack('H*', md5($hash . $password)); + } while (--$count); + } + + $output = substr($setting, 0, 12); + $output .= $this->encode64($hash, 16); + + return $output; + } + + function gensalt_extended($input) + { + $count_log2 = min($this->iteration_count_log2 + 8, 24); + # This should be odd to not reveal weak DES keys, and the + # maximum valid value is (2**24 - 1) which is odd anyway. + $count = (1 << $count_log2) - 1; + + $output = '_'; + $output .= $this->itoa64[$count & 0x3f]; + $output .= $this->itoa64[($count >> 6) & 0x3f]; + $output .= $this->itoa64[($count >> 12) & 0x3f]; + $output .= $this->itoa64[($count >> 18) & 0x3f]; + + $output .= $this->encode64($input, 3); + + return $output; + } + + function gensalt_blowfish($input) + { + # This one needs to use a different order of characters and a + # different encoding scheme from the one in encode64() above. + # We care because the last character in our encoded string will + # only represent 2 bits. While two known implementations of + # bcrypt will happily accept and correct a salt string which + # has the 4 unused bits set to non-zero, we do not want to take + # chances and we also do not want to waste an additional byte + # of entropy. + $itoa64 = './ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789'; + + $output = '$2a$'; + $output .= chr(ord('0') + $this->iteration_count_log2 / 10); + $output .= chr(ord('0') + $this->iteration_count_log2 % 10); + $output .= '$'; + + $i = 0; + do { + $c1 = ord($input[$i++]); + $output .= $itoa64[$c1 >> 2]; + $c1 = ($c1 & 0x03) << 4; + if ($i >= 16) { + $output .= $itoa64[$c1]; + break; + } + + $c2 = ord($input[$i++]); + $c1 |= $c2 >> 4; + $output .= $itoa64[$c1]; + $c1 = ($c2 & 0x0f) << 2; + + $c2 = ord($input[$i++]); + $c1 |= $c2 >> 6; + $output .= $itoa64[$c1]; + $output .= $itoa64[$c2 & 0x3f]; + } while (1); + + return $output; + } + + function HashPassword($password) + { + $random = ''; + + if (CRYPT_BLOWFISH == 1 && !$this->portable_hashes) { + $random = $this->get_random_bytes(16); + $hash = + crypt($password, $this->gensalt_blowfish($random)); + if (strlen($hash) == 60) + return $hash; + } + + if (CRYPT_EXT_DES == 1 && !$this->portable_hashes) { + if (strlen($random) < 3) + $random = $this->get_random_bytes(3); + $hash = + crypt($password, $this->gensalt_extended($random)); + if (strlen($hash) == 20) + return $hash; + } + + if (strlen($random) < 6) + $random = $this->get_random_bytes(6); + $hash = + $this->crypt_private($password, + $this->gensalt_private($random)); + if (strlen($hash) == 34) + return $hash; + + # Returning '*' on error is safe here, but would _not_ be safe + # in a crypt(3)-like function used _both_ for generating new + # hashes and for validating passwords against existing hashes. + return '*'; + } + + function CheckPassword($password, $stored_hash) + { + $hash = $this->crypt_private($password, $stored_hash); + if ($hash[0] == '*') + $hash = crypt($password, $stored_hash); + + return $hash == $stored_hash; + } +} + +?> -- cgit v1.2.3-24-g4f1b