From 37f4b9caa02783e06dd7c5318200113409a0deb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Derek Jones Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2011 17:56:50 -0500 Subject: backed out 648b42a75739, which was a NON-trivial whitespace commit. It broke the Typography class's string replacements, for instance --- system/core/Security.php | 104 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-) (limited to 'system/core/Security.php') diff --git a/system/core/Security.php b/system/core/Security.php index f5bfafd9b..3617cadcc 100644 --- a/system/core/Security.php +++ b/system/core/Security.php @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ - '[removed]', // IE, surprise! "Redirect\s+302" => '[removed]' ); - + /** * Constructor */ @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ class CI_Security { } // Do the tokens exist in both the _POST and _COOKIE arrays? - if ( ! isset($_POST[$this->_csrf_token_name]) OR + if ( ! isset($_POST[$this->_csrf_token_name]) OR ! isset($_COOKIE[$this->_csrf_cookie_name])) { $this->csrf_show_error(); @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ class CI_Security { $this->csrf_show_error(); } - // We kill this since we're done and we don't want to + // We kill this since we're done and we don't want to // polute the _POST array unset($_POST[$this->_csrf_token_name]); @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ class CI_Security { $this->csrf_set_cookie(); log_message('debug', "CSRF token verified "); - + return $this; } @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ class CI_Security { setcookie($this->_csrf_cookie_name, $this->_csrf_hash, $expire, config_item('cookie_path'), config_item('cookie_domain'), $secure_cookie); log_message('debug', "CRSF cookie Set"); - + return $this; } @@ -165,9 +165,9 @@ class CI_Security { // -------------------------------------------------------------------- /** - * Get CSRF Hash + * Get CSRF Hash * - * Getter Method + * Getter Method * * @return string self::_csrf_hash */ @@ -196,14 +196,14 @@ class CI_Security { * XSS Clean * * Sanitizes data so that Cross Site Scripting Hacks can be - * prevented. This function does a fair amount of work but + * prevented. This function does a fair amount of work but * it is extremely thorough, designed to prevent even the - * most obscure XSS attempts. Nothing is ever 100% foolproof, + * most obscure XSS attempts. Nothing is ever 100% foolproof, * of course, but I haven't been able to get anything passed * the filter. * * Note: This function should only be used to deal with data - * upon submission. It's not something that should + * upon submission. It's not something that should * be used for general runtime processing. * * This function was based in part on some code and ideas I @@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ class CI_Security { */ $str = preg_replace_callback("/[a-z]+=([\'\"]).*?\\1/si", array($this, '_convert_attribute'), $str); - + $str = preg_replace_callback("/<\w+.*?(?=>|<|$)/si", array($this, '_decode_entity'), $str); /* @@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ class CI_Security { * * This prevents strings like this: ja vascript * NOTE: we deal with spaces between characters later. - * NOTE: preg_replace was found to be amazingly slow here on + * NOTE: preg_replace was found to be amazingly slow here on * large blocks of data, so we use str_replace. */ @@ -304,27 +304,27 @@ class CI_Security { */ if ($is_image === TRUE) { - // Images have a tendency to have the PHP short opening and - // closing tags every so often so we skip those and only + // Images have a tendency to have the PHP short opening and + // closing tags every so often so we skip those and only // do the long opening tags. $str = preg_replace('/<\?(php)/i', "<?\\1", $str); } else { - $str = str_replace(array(''), array('<?', '?>'), $str); + $str = str_replace(array(''), array('<?', '?>'), $str); } /* * Compact any exploded words * - * This corrects words like: j a v a s c r i p t + * This corrects words like: j a v a s c r i p t * These words are compacted back to their correct state. */ $words = array( - 'javascript', 'expression', 'vbscript', 'script', + 'javascript', 'expression', 'vbscript', 'script', 'applet', 'alert', 'document', 'write', 'cookie', 'window' ); - + foreach ($words as $word) { $temp = ''; @@ -341,8 +341,8 @@ class CI_Security { /* * Remove disallowed Javascript in links or img tags - * We used to do some version comparisons and use of stripos for PHP5, - * but it is dog slow compared to these simplified non-capturing + * We used to do some version comparisons and use of stripos for PHP5, + * but it is dog slow compared to these simplified non-capturing * preg_match(), especially if the pattern exists in the string */ do @@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ class CI_Security { * * Similar to above, only instead of looking for * tags it looks for PHP and JavaScript commands - * that are disallowed. Rather than removing the + * that are disallowed. Rather than removing the * code, it simply converts the parenthesis to entities * rendering the code un-executable. * @@ -405,11 +405,11 @@ class CI_Security { /* * Images are Handled in a Special Way - * - Essentially, we want to know that after all of the character - * conversion is done whether any unwanted, likely XSS, code was found. + * - Essentially, we want to know that after all of the character + * conversion is done whether any unwanted, likely XSS, code was found. * If not, we return TRUE, as the image is clean. - * However, if the string post-conversion does not matched the - * string post-removal of XSS, then it fails, as there was unwanted XSS + * However, if the string post-conversion does not matched the + * string post-removal of XSS, then it fails, as there was unwanted XSS * code found and removed/changed during processing. */ @@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ class CI_Security { * * In some versions of PHP the native function does not work * when UTF-8 is the specified character set, so this gives us - * a work-around. More info here: + * a work-around. More info here: * http://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=25670 * * NOTE: html_entity_decode() has a bug in some PHP versions when UTF-8 is the @@ -475,10 +475,10 @@ class CI_Security { // The reason we are not using html_entity_decode() by itself is because // while it is not technically correct to leave out the semicolon // at the end of an entity most browsers will still interpret the entity - // correctly. html_entity_decode() does not convert entities without + // correctly. html_entity_decode() does not convert entities without // semicolons, so we are left with our own little solution here. Bummer. - if (function_exists('html_entity_decode') && + if (function_exists('html_entity_decode') && (strtolower($charset) != 'utf-8')) { $str = html_entity_decode($str, ENT_COMPAT, $charset); @@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ class CI_Security { "%3b", // ; "%3d" // = ); - + if ( ! $relative_path) { $bad[] = './'; @@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ class CI_Security { } // -------------------------------------------------------------------- - + /* * Remove Evil HTML Attributes (like evenhandlers and style) * @@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ class CI_Security { * - Everything up until a space * For example, everything between the pipes: * - * - Everything inside the quotes + * - Everything inside the quotes * For example, everything between the pipes: * * @@ -594,12 +594,12 @@ class CI_Security { if ($is_image === TRUE) { /* - * Adobe Photoshop puts XML metadata into JFIF images, + * Adobe Photoshop puts XML metadata into JFIF images, * including namespacing, so we have to allow this for images. */ unset($evil_attributes[array_search('xmlns', $evil_attributes)]); } - + do { $str = preg_replace( "#<(/?[^><]+?)([^A-Za-z\-])(".implode('|', $evil_attributes).")(\s*=\s*)([\"][^>]*?[\"]|[\'][^>]*?[\']|[^>]*?)([\s><])([><]*)#i", @@ -607,10 +607,10 @@ class CI_Security { $str, -1, $count ); } while ($count); - + return $str; } - + // -------------------------------------------------------------------- /** @@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ class CI_Security { $str = '<'.$matches[1].$matches[2].$matches[3]; // encode captured opening or closing brace to prevent recursive vectors - $str .= str_replace(array('>', '<'), array('>', '<'), + $str .= str_replace(array('>', '<'), array('>', '<'), $matches[4]); return $str; @@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ class CI_Security { protected function _js_link_removal($match) { $attributes = $this->_filter_attributes(str_replace(array('<', '>'), '', $match[1])); - + return str_replace($match[1], preg_replace("#href=.*?(alert\(|alert&\#40;|javascript\:|livescript\:|mocha\:|charset\=|window\.|document\.|\.cookie|_filter_attributes(str_replace(array('<', '>'), '', $match[1])); - + return str_replace($match[1], preg_replace("#src=.*?(alert\(|alert&\#40;|javascript\:|livescript\:|mocha\:|charset\=|window\.|document\.|\.cookie|xss_hash()."\\1=\\2", $str); /* * Validate standard character entities * - * Add a semicolon if missing. We do this to enable + * Add a semicolon if missing. We do this to enable * the conversion of entities to ASCII later. * */ @@ -769,7 +769,7 @@ class CI_Security { * Un-Protect GET variables in URLs */ $str = str_replace($this->xss_hash(), '&', $str); - + return $str; } @@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ class CI_Security { { $str = preg_replace("#".$key."#i", $val, $str); } - + return $str; } @@ -809,16 +809,16 @@ class CI_Security { { if ($this->_csrf_hash == '') { - // If the cookie exists we will use it's value. + // If the cookie exists we will use it's value. // We don't necessarily want to regenerate it with - // each page load since a page could contain embedded + // each page load since a page could contain embedded // sub-pages causing this feature to fail - if (isset($_COOKIE[$this->_csrf_cookie_name]) && + if (isset($_COOKIE[$this->_csrf_cookie_name]) && $_COOKIE[$this->_csrf_cookie_name] != '') { return $this->_csrf_hash = $_COOKIE[$this->_csrf_cookie_name]; } - + return $this->_csrf_hash = md5(uniqid(rand(), TRUE)); } -- cgit v1.2.3-24-g4f1b