summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/system/core/Security.php
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorDerek Jones <derek.jones@ellislab.com>2011-07-02 00:56:50 +0200
committerDerek Jones <derek.jones@ellislab.com>2011-07-02 00:56:50 +0200
commit37f4b9caa02783e06dd7c5318200113409a0deb1 (patch)
tree314bd87831a09913cbbfd1ffe1447b3c38b394c5 /system/core/Security.php
parent114ab0988e20ac6be39ad363ff897a1a3b85e565 (diff)
backed out 648b42a75739, which was a NON-trivial whitespace commit. It broke the Typography class's string replacements, for instance
Diffstat (limited to 'system/core/Security.php')
-rw-r--r--system/core/Security.php104
1 files changed, 52 insertions, 52 deletions
diff --git a/system/core/Security.php b/system/core/Security.php
index f5bfafd9b..3617cadcc 100644
--- a/system/core/Security.php
+++ b/system/core/Security.php
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<?php if ( ! defined('BASEPATH')) exit('No direct script access allowed');
+<?php if ( ! defined('BASEPATH')) exit('No direct script access allowed');
/**
* CodeIgniter
*
@@ -25,10 +25,10 @@
* @link http://codeigniter.com/user_guide/libraries/security.html
*/
class CI_Security {
-
+
protected $_xss_hash = '';
protected $_csrf_hash = '';
- protected $_csrf_expire = 7200; // Two hours (in seconds)
+ protected $_csrf_expire = 7200; // Two hours (in seconds)
protected $_csrf_token_name = 'ci_csrf_token';
protected $_csrf_cookie_name = 'ci_csrf_token';
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ class CI_Security {
"vbscript\s*:" => '[removed]', // IE, surprise!
"Redirect\s+302" => '[removed]'
);
-
+
/**
* Constructor
*/
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ class CI_Security {
}
// Do the tokens exist in both the _POST and _COOKIE arrays?
- if ( ! isset($_POST[$this->_csrf_token_name]) OR
+ if ( ! isset($_POST[$this->_csrf_token_name]) OR
! isset($_COOKIE[$this->_csrf_cookie_name]))
{
$this->csrf_show_error();
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ class CI_Security {
$this->csrf_show_error();
}
- // We kill this since we're done and we don't want to
+ // We kill this since we're done and we don't want to
// polute the _POST array
unset($_POST[$this->_csrf_token_name]);
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ class CI_Security {
$this->csrf_set_cookie();
log_message('debug', "CSRF token verified ");
-
+
return $this;
}
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ class CI_Security {
setcookie($this->_csrf_cookie_name, $this->_csrf_hash, $expire, config_item('cookie_path'), config_item('cookie_domain'), $secure_cookie);
log_message('debug', "CRSF cookie Set");
-
+
return $this;
}
@@ -165,9 +165,9 @@ class CI_Security {
// --------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
- * Get CSRF Hash
+ * Get CSRF Hash
*
- * Getter Method
+ * Getter Method
*
* @return string self::_csrf_hash
*/
@@ -196,14 +196,14 @@ class CI_Security {
* XSS Clean
*
* Sanitizes data so that Cross Site Scripting Hacks can be
- * prevented. This function does a fair amount of work but
+ * prevented. This function does a fair amount of work but
* it is extremely thorough, designed to prevent even the
- * most obscure XSS attempts. Nothing is ever 100% foolproof,
+ * most obscure XSS attempts. Nothing is ever 100% foolproof,
* of course, but I haven't been able to get anything passed
* the filter.
*
* Note: This function should only be used to deal with data
- * upon submission. It's not something that should
+ * upon submission. It's not something that should
* be used for general runtime processing.
*
* This function was based in part on some code and ideas I
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ class CI_Security {
*/
$str = preg_replace_callback("/[a-z]+=([\'\"]).*?\\1/si", array($this, '_convert_attribute'), $str);
-
+
$str = preg_replace_callback("/<\w+.*?(?=>|<|$)/si", array($this, '_decode_entity'), $str);
/*
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ class CI_Security {
*
* This prevents strings like this: ja vascript
* NOTE: we deal with spaces between characters later.
- * NOTE: preg_replace was found to be amazingly slow here on
+ * NOTE: preg_replace was found to be amazingly slow here on
* large blocks of data, so we use str_replace.
*/
@@ -304,27 +304,27 @@ class CI_Security {
*/
if ($is_image === TRUE)
{
- // Images have a tendency to have the PHP short opening and
- // closing tags every so often so we skip those and only
+ // Images have a tendency to have the PHP short opening and
+ // closing tags every so often so we skip those and only
// do the long opening tags.
$str = preg_replace('/<\?(php)/i', "&lt;?\\1", $str);
}
else
{
- $str = str_replace(array('<?', '?'.'>'), array('&lt;?', '?&gt;'), $str);
+ $str = str_replace(array('<?', '?'.'>'), array('&lt;?', '?&gt;'), $str);
}
/*
* Compact any exploded words
*
- * This corrects words like: j a v a s c r i p t
+ * This corrects words like: j a v a s c r i p t
* These words are compacted back to their correct state.
*/
$words = array(
- 'javascript', 'expression', 'vbscript', 'script',
+ 'javascript', 'expression', 'vbscript', 'script',
'applet', 'alert', 'document', 'write', 'cookie', 'window'
);
-
+
foreach ($words as $word)
{
$temp = '';
@@ -341,8 +341,8 @@ class CI_Security {
/*
* Remove disallowed Javascript in links or img tags
- * We used to do some version comparisons and use of stripos for PHP5,
- * but it is dog slow compared to these simplified non-capturing
+ * We used to do some version comparisons and use of stripos for PHP5,
+ * but it is dog slow compared to these simplified non-capturing
* preg_match(), especially if the pattern exists in the string
*/
do
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ class CI_Security {
*
* Similar to above, only instead of looking for
* tags it looks for PHP and JavaScript commands
- * that are disallowed. Rather than removing the
+ * that are disallowed. Rather than removing the
* code, it simply converts the parenthesis to entities
* rendering the code un-executable.
*
@@ -405,11 +405,11 @@ class CI_Security {
/*
* Images are Handled in a Special Way
- * - Essentially, we want to know that after all of the character
- * conversion is done whether any unwanted, likely XSS, code was found.
+ * - Essentially, we want to know that after all of the character
+ * conversion is done whether any unwanted, likely XSS, code was found.
* If not, we return TRUE, as the image is clean.
- * However, if the string post-conversion does not matched the
- * string post-removal of XSS, then it fails, as there was unwanted XSS
+ * However, if the string post-conversion does not matched the
+ * string post-removal of XSS, then it fails, as there was unwanted XSS
* code found and removed/changed during processing.
*/
@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ class CI_Security {
*
* In some versions of PHP the native function does not work
* when UTF-8 is the specified character set, so this gives us
- * a work-around. More info here:
+ * a work-around. More info here:
* http://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=25670
*
* NOTE: html_entity_decode() has a bug in some PHP versions when UTF-8 is the
@@ -475,10 +475,10 @@ class CI_Security {
// The reason we are not using html_entity_decode() by itself is because
// while it is not technically correct to leave out the semicolon
// at the end of an entity most browsers will still interpret the entity
- // correctly. html_entity_decode() does not convert entities without
+ // correctly. html_entity_decode() does not convert entities without
// semicolons, so we are left with our own little solution here. Bummer.
- if (function_exists('html_entity_decode') &&
+ if (function_exists('html_entity_decode') &&
(strtolower($charset) != 'utf-8'))
{
$str = html_entity_decode($str, ENT_COMPAT, $charset);
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ class CI_Security {
"%3b", // ;
"%3d" // =
);
-
+
if ( ! $relative_path)
{
$bad[] = './';
@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ class CI_Security {
}
// --------------------------------------------------------------------
-
+
/*
* Remove Evil HTML Attributes (like evenhandlers and style)
*
@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ class CI_Security {
* - Everything up until a space
* For example, everything between the pipes:
* <a |style=document.write('hello');alert('world');| class=link>
- * - Everything inside the quotes
+ * - Everything inside the quotes
* For example, everything between the pipes:
* <a |style="document.write('hello'); alert('world');"| class="link">
*
@@ -594,12 +594,12 @@ class CI_Security {
if ($is_image === TRUE)
{
/*
- * Adobe Photoshop puts XML metadata into JFIF images,
+ * Adobe Photoshop puts XML metadata into JFIF images,
* including namespacing, so we have to allow this for images.
*/
unset($evil_attributes[array_search('xmlns', $evil_attributes)]);
}
-
+
do {
$str = preg_replace(
"#<(/?[^><]+?)([^A-Za-z\-])(".implode('|', $evil_attributes).")(\s*=\s*)([\"][^>]*?[\"]|[\'][^>]*?[\']|[^>]*?)([\s><])([><]*)#i",
@@ -607,10 +607,10 @@ class CI_Security {
$str, -1, $count
);
} while ($count);
-
+
return $str;
}
-
+
// --------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ class CI_Security {
$str = '&lt;'.$matches[1].$matches[2].$matches[3];
// encode captured opening or closing brace to prevent recursive vectors
- $str .= str_replace(array('>', '<'), array('&gt;', '&lt;'),
+ $str .= str_replace(array('>', '<'), array('&gt;', '&lt;'),
$matches[4]);
return $str;
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ class CI_Security {
protected function _js_link_removal($match)
{
$attributes = $this->_filter_attributes(str_replace(array('<', '>'), '', $match[1]));
-
+
return str_replace($match[1], preg_replace("#href=.*?(alert\(|alert&\#40;|javascript\:|livescript\:|mocha\:|charset\=|window\.|document\.|\.cookie|<script|<xss|base64\s*,)#si", "", $attributes), $match[0]);
}
@@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ class CI_Security {
protected function _js_img_removal($match)
{
$attributes = $this->_filter_attributes(str_replace(array('<', '>'), '', $match[1]));
-
+
return str_replace($match[1], preg_replace("#src=.*?(alert\(|alert&\#40;|javascript\:|livescript\:|mocha\:|charset\=|window\.|document\.|\.cookie|<script|<xss|base64\s*,)#si", "", $attributes), $match[0]);
}
@@ -729,13 +729,13 @@ class CI_Security {
}
// --------------------------------------------------------------------
-
+
/**
* Validate URL entities
*
* Called by xss_clean()
*
- * @param string
+ * @param string
* @return string
*/
protected function _validate_entities($str)
@@ -743,15 +743,15 @@ class CI_Security {
/*
* Protect GET variables in URLs
*/
-
+
// 901119URL5918AMP18930PROTECT8198
-
+
$str = preg_replace('|\&([a-z\_0-9\-]+)\=([a-z\_0-9\-]+)|i', $this->xss_hash()."\\1=\\2", $str);
/*
* Validate standard character entities
*
- * Add a semicolon if missing. We do this to enable
+ * Add a semicolon if missing. We do this to enable
* the conversion of entities to ASCII later.
*
*/
@@ -769,7 +769,7 @@ class CI_Security {
* Un-Protect GET variables in URLs
*/
$str = str_replace($this->xss_hash(), '&', $str);
-
+
return $str;
}
@@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ class CI_Security {
{
$str = preg_replace("#".$key."#i", $val, $str);
}
-
+
return $str;
}
@@ -809,16 +809,16 @@ class CI_Security {
{
if ($this->_csrf_hash == '')
{
- // If the cookie exists we will use it's value.
+ // If the cookie exists we will use it's value.
// We don't necessarily want to regenerate it with
- // each page load since a page could contain embedded
+ // each page load since a page could contain embedded
// sub-pages causing this feature to fail
- if (isset($_COOKIE[$this->_csrf_cookie_name]) &&
+ if (isset($_COOKIE[$this->_csrf_cookie_name]) &&
$_COOKIE[$this->_csrf_cookie_name] != '')
{
return $this->_csrf_hash = $_COOKIE[$this->_csrf_cookie_name];
}
-
+
return $this->_csrf_hash = md5(uniqid(rand(), TRUE));
}